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Abstract
We introduce empirical equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium. In contrast
to previous refinements in the literature, empirical equilibrium is based solely on ob-
servables and does not determine as implausible all weakly dominated behavior. We
show that a distribution of play is an empirical equilibrium if and only if it is the limit
of regular Quantal Response Equilibria associated with quantal responses that are util-
ity maximizing in the limit. This result provides a direct link between the practice of
experimental economics and our refinement.
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1 Introduction
Em·pir·i·cal: based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or expe-
rience rather than theory or pure logic.1
We introduce empirical equilibrium, a normal-form refinement of Nash equilibrium. In
contrast to previous refinements in the literature, empirical equilibrium is based solely on
observables and does not determine as implausible all weakly dominated behavior. Our main
results provide a behavioral foundation for this refinement based on two cornerstone models
that account for deviations from utility maximizing behavior: regular Quantal Response
Equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996; Goeree et al., 2005) and control costs
games (van Damme, 1991).
It is well known that the set of Nash equilibria of a game may contain elements that are
implausible. That is, it is somehow evident that some Nash equilibria are not likely to be
observed if the game actually takes place (see Example 1). If one is interested in the positive
content of this theory, this is problematic. In applications, one often performs extreme case
scenario analyses based on the set of outcomes predicted for a certain game by a solution
concept. If some of these outcomes are implausible, then a worst case scenario analysis
can be unnecessarily pessimistic, and a best case scenario analysis can be unrealistically
optimistic.
The response of game theory and economics to this problem has been to advance equi-
librium refinements, i.e., selections from the Nash equilibrium solution. With only few
exceptions, which have never been used in applications nor further studied (see Sec. 2),
equilibrium refinements determine as implausible each equilibrium in which an agent plays
a weakly dominated action with positive probability (from Selten, 1975 and Myerson, 1978,
to Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986 and the latest iterations in Milgrom and Mollner, 2017 and
Fudenberg and He, 2018; see van Damme, 1991 for an earlier survey). These equilibrium
refinements have been widely used in applications. They are explicitly invoked to obtain
comparative statics in strategic environments (e.g., Milgrom and Mollner, 2017; Fudenberg
and He, 2018). They, are also explicitly used to overcome the negative results that one
arrives at with a worst case scenario analysis of mechanisms based on the full set of Nash
equilibria (Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson, 1992). Finally, they implicitly support the
design of strategy-proof institutions, usually advocated, when available, in market design
environments (e.g., Roth, 1984; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003).
In what seems to be moving in a parallel universe, experimental studies have shown that
weakly dominated behavior is persistently observed in strategic situations. In particular,
1Google Dictionary search on Nov. 15, 2017.
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a robust body of evidence has emerged from experiments in games that have dominant
strategy equilibria induced by strategy-proof mechanisms (Coppinger et al., 1980; Kagel
et al., 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Attiyeh et al., 2000; Harstad, 2000; Cason et al., 2006;
Chen and So¨nmez, 2006; Andreoni et al., 2007; Li, 2017). More recently, the analysis of large
field data sets from high stakes games, as career choice and school choice, is corroborating
the findings from laboratory experiments (Hassidim et al., 2016; Artemov et al., 2017; Rees-
Jones, 2017; Chen and Pereyra, 2018).
This stark contradiction of theory and data motivates us to give a fresh look at the
plausibility of Nash equilibria. Our proposal is to refine this set based solely on regularities
observed in data by means of the following thought experiment. We imagine that we model
the unobservables that explain observable behavior in our environment.2 For instance, we
construct a randomly disturbed payoff model (Harsanyi, 1973; van Damme, 1991), a control
cost model (van Damme, 1991), a structural QRE model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995),
a regular QRE model (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996; Goeree et al., 2005), etc. In order to
bring our model to accepted standards of science we need to make sure it is falsifiable. We
observe that in the most popular models for the analysis of experimental data, including
the ones just mentioned, this has been done by requiring consistency with an a priori
observable restriction for which there is empirical support, weak payoff monotonicity.3 This
property of the full profile of empirical distributions of play in a game requires that for each
agent, differences in behavior reveal differences in expected utility. That is, between two
alternative actions for an agent, say a and b, if the agent plays a with higher frequency than
b, it is because given what the other agents are doing, a has higher expected utility than b.
Finally, we proceed with our study and define a refinement of Nash equilibrium by means of
“approachability” by behavior in our model a` la Harsanyi (1973), van Damme (1991), and
McKelvey and Palfrey (1996). That is, we label as implausible the Nash equilibria of our
game that are not the limit of a sequence of behavior that can be generated by our model.
If our model is well-specified, the equilibria that are ruled implausible by our refinement,
will never be approached by observable behavior even when distributions of play approach
mutual best responses.4 Of course, we are not sure what the true model is. Our thought
2Our benchmark is an experimental environment in which the researcher observes payoffs and samples
frequencies of play. This observable payoffs framework is also a valuable benchmark for the foundation of
Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1973).
3Harsanyi (1973) does not explicitly impose weak payoff monotonicity in his randomly perturbed payoff
models. The objective of his study is to show that certain properties hold for all randomly perturbed payoff
models with vanishing perturbations for generic games. This makes unnecessary to discipline the model
with a priori restrictions. van Damme (1991) requires permutation invariance on Harsanyi (1973)’s models.
This induces weak payoff monotonicity.
4We have in mind an unmodeled evolutionary process by which behavior approaches a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we are essentially interested in the situations in which eventually a game form is a good approximation
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experiment was already fruitful, however. We learned that if we were able to construct the
true model and our a priori restriction does not hinder its specification, the Nash equilibria
that we would identify as implausible will necessarily contain those in the complement of
the closure of weakly payoff monotone behavior. This leads us to the definition of empirical
equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium for which there is a sequence of weakly payoff monotone
distributions of play converging to it. The complement of this refinement (in the Nash
equilibrium set), the empirically implausible equilibria, are the Nash equilibria that are
determined implausible by any theory that is disciplined by weak payoff monotonicity.5
An immediate question that arises is whether weak payoff monotonicity is indeed a char-
acterizing property of empirical distributions of behavior in games. That is, to what extent
our basis for plausibility is indeed supported by data? In this paper we pursue an indirect
theoretical answer to this question.6 We consider an equilibrium model satisfying weak pay-
off monotonicity that is a staple of empirical analysis of games, regular QRE. This model
has been successful in fitting data and in providing a rational for the comparative statics
observed in experiments in a wide range of strategic situations (see Goeree et al., 2016, for
a survey). This model also allows us to articulate the idea of increasing sophistication and
proximity to utility maximization. We prove the following results:
1. A distribution of play is an empirical equilibrium of a game if and only if it is the
limit of regular QRE associated with quantal responses that are utility maximizing in the
limit (Theorem 2).
2. A distribution of play is an empirical equilibrium of a game if and only if it is the
limit of equilibria in associated control cost games for vanishing spline cost functions, a
form of regular QRE suitable for maximum likelihood estimation (Theorem 3).
This characterization of empirical equilibria provides a link between the practice of
experimental economics and our refinement: If data will satisfactorily fit a regular QRE
model, empirical distributions of play can accumulate towards a certain distribution as
agents approximate best responders only if this distribution is an empirical equilibrium.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sec. 2 places our contribution in the context of the
literature. Sec. 3 presents the model. Sec. 4 presents three examples that provide intuition
about the ability of empirical equilibria to discriminate among weakly dominated behavior
of the strategic situation we model, as when perturbations vanish in Harsanyi (1973)’s approachability theory.
5In a paper that circulated simultaneously with the first version of our paper, Goeree et al. (2018) study
the empirical restrictions imposed by a ranking based form of payoff monotonicity that is satisfied by each
Nash equilibrium. Thus, this analysis does not produce a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which is our
fundamental contribution. At a technical level, our results overlap with theirs only in that they prove a
result equivalent to our Lemma 2. They do not address the approximation of Nash equilibria by means of
increasingly sophisticated regular QRE, nor by means of a finite dimensional form of regular QRE.
6We advance a direct analysis of data in Brown and Velez (2019) and Velez and Brown (2019a). We
discuss these findings in Sec. 6.1.
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and its independence from other refinements in the literature. It is worth noting that em-
pirical equilibrium is not an example-driven definition. Its definition has not been adapted
so it resolves the plausibility of equilibria in a certain class of games in a way that conforms
with a particular intuition. The defining feature of this equilibrium refinement is that it
seeks to base its selection of equilibria on a testable property of behavior. Sec. 5 presents
our main results. Sec. 6 discusses possible violations of weak payoff monotonicity, our im-
plicit assumption of convergence, the implications of Harsanyi (1973)’s purification result
in empirical equilibrium analysis, and the normative content of empirical equilibrium. The
Appendix contains all proofs.
2 Related literature
The main difference of empirical equilibrium and the refinements previously studied in the
literature is that it does not automatically discard all weakly dominated behavior, i.e., it vi-
olates the so-called admissibility (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). Strictly speaking there are
three precedents for a refinement violating this property. van Damme (1991)’s firm equilibria
and uniformly-vanishing control costs approachable equilibria, and McKelvey and Palfrey
(1996)’s logistic QRE approachable equilibria, also violate admissibility.7 Firm equilibria
and vanishing control costs approachable equilibria were developed as basic frameworks to
add restrictions and provide foundations for other equilibrium refinements that do elimi-
nate weakly dominated behavior, e.g., Selten (1975)’s perfect equilibria. Their potential
as stand alone refinements has never been explored. Logistic QRE approachable equilib-
ria was mentioned as a theoretical possibility by McKelvey and Palfrey (1996), but was
never studied or used in any application. At a technical level, firm equilibria and logistic
QRE approachable equilibria can be strict subsets of empirical equilibria (Velez and Brown,
2019c). Uniformly-vanishing control cost approachable equilibria are a subset of empirical
equilibria. It is an open question to determine if this inclusion can be strict as well.
Economists have seldom challenged admissibility. There are three notable exceptions.
Nachbar (1990) and Dekel and Scotchmer (1992) observed that weakly dominated behavior
can result from the evolution of strategies that are updated by means of simple intuitive
rules. Perhaps the study that is most skeptical of admissibility is Samuelson (1992), who
shows that it has no solid epistemic foundation in all games.
7McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)’s limiting equilibrium and its generalizations by Zhang (2016), should not
be confused with the logistic QRE approachable equilibria. The former are single valued selections from
the Nash equilibrium set that are defined for generic games only. They select the unique equilibrium that
is approached by a central branch of the logistic QRE correspondence or a family of QRE correspondences
that satisfy certain differentiability properties.
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Since we are interested in determining the plausibility of a Nash equilibrium by the
existence of plausible behavior arbitrarily close to it, our work is similar in spirit to Harsanyi
(1973), who studied the plausibility of Nash equilibria based on approximation by behavior
in information-wise neighboring games; and Rosenthal (1989), who aimed at the analysis
of a stricter form of weakly payoff monotone behavior with a particular linear form in
two-by-two games.
Our main result characterizes our refinement by means of proximity of regular QRE
behavior. The most common form of this model in applications is McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995)’s structural QRE (Goeree et al., 2016). As in Harsanyi (1973), but with some
minor technical differences, behavior in the structural QRE model is generated by utility
maximization in an information neighboring game. An immediate question is whether
empirical equilibria can be characterized as the limits of behavior in structural QRE and
Harsanyi (1973)’s randomly perturbed games that satisfy weak payoff monotonicity. In
a companion paper we show that this is not so (Velez and Brown, 2019c). Intuitively,
empirical equilibrium is a non-parametric definition, and structural QRE and Harsanyi
(1973)’s games are constrained by the separability of payoffs and perturbations.
Finally, our paper opens up an agenda of research in which one reevaluates the appli-
cations of game theory based on our equilibrium refinement. We have made three concrete
advances that show empirical equilibrium analysis is consequential for the design of economic
institutions. (i) In Velez and Brown (2019b) we study the plausibility of weakly dominated
equilibria in strategy-proof games. The significant news is that for strategy-proof mecha-
nisms for which dominant strategies are essentially unique, weakly payoff monotone behavior
can accumulate towards a bad equilibrium only in boundary information structures. This
provocative prediction of empirical equilibrium analysis is consistent with behavior in ex-
periments run a decade ago by Andreoni et al. (2007), and produces an alternative line
of design to the stricter “obvious strategy-proofness” program of Li (2017). (ii) It is well
known that if a worst case scenario analysis of a mechanism is done with the whole set
of Nash equilibria, there are clear limits to the social choice correspondences that can be
implemented. These so-called Maskin monotonicity restrictions of the Nash implementable
correspondences, disappear if one limits attention to undominated equilibria (Palfrey and
Srivastava, 1991; Jackson, 1992). The evidence mentioned above allows one to reject un-
dominated equilibria as a universal plausibility standard for games, however. Thus, this
result is of dubious practical use. By contrast, in Velez and Brown (2019a) we show, by
means of a full analysis of a partnership dissolution problem, that a mechanism designer
who performs a worst case scenario analysis based on empirical equilibrium is also not
constrained by Maskin monotonicity. Thus, it is plausible that a mechanism designer can
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achieve objectives that he or she would determine impossible based on the Nash equilibrium
prediction. This also means that a mechanism designer who evaluates a mechanism based
on the full Nash equilibrium prediction can be designing implicitly biased mechanisms. (iii)
In Brown and Velez (2019) we present experimental evidence in a partnership dissolution
environment that supports weak payoff monotonicity and the comparative statics predicted
by empirical equilibrium in this environment. That is, the implicit bias of mechanisms that
is identified by empirical equilibrium, but not by the Nash equilibrium solution, is present
in data.
3 Model
We study the plausibility of Nash equilibria in a finite normal form game Γ ≡ (N,A, u)
where N ≡ {1, ..., n} is a set of agents; (Ai)i∈N are the corresponding action spaces and
A ≡ A1 × · · · × An the set of action profiles; and u ≡ (ui)i∈N is the profile of expected
utility indices, i.e., functions ui : A → R. Our interpretation of the game is standard.
Agents simultaneously choose an action. Given that action profile a ≡ (ai)i∈N is chosen,
agent i’s payoff is ui(a).
A strategy for agent i is a probability distribution on Ai, denoted generically by σi ∈
∆(Ai). A pure strategy places probability one on a given action. We identify pure strategies
with the actions themselves. A strategy is interior if it places positive probability on each
possible action. A profile of strategies is denoted by σ ≡ (σi)i∈N ∈ ∆ ≡ ∆(A1)×· · ·×∆(An).
Given S ⊆ N , we denote a subprofile of strategies for these agents by σS. When S = N \{i},
we simply write σ−i ∈ ∆−i ≡ ×j∈N\{i}∆(Aj). Consistently, we concatenate partial strategy
profiles as in (σ−i, µi). We consistently use this convention when operating with vectors, as
with action profiles.
Agent i’s expected utility given strategy profile σ is
Ui(σ) =
∑
a∈A
ui(a)σ(a),
where σ(a) = σ1(a1) . . . σn(an). Following our convention of identifying pure strategies with
actions, we write Ui(σ−i, ai) for the utility that agent i gets from playing actions ai when
the other play σ−i. We say that an action ai ∈ Ai is weakly dominated by action aˆi ∈ Ai if
for each a−i ∈ A−i, ui(a−i, aˆi) ≥ ui(a) with strict inequality for at least an element of A−i.
We say that ai ∈ Ai is a weakly dominated action if there is another action that weakly
dominates it.
The following are the basic prediction for game Γ and three of its most prominent
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refinements.
1. (Nash, 1951) A Nash equilibrium of Γ is a profile of strategies σ, such that for each
i ∈ N and each µi ∈ ∆(Ai), Ui(σ) ≥ Ui(σ−i, µi) . We denote this set by N(Γ).
2. An undominated Nash equilibrium of Γ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ in which no agent
plays with positive probability a weakly dominated action. We denote this set by
U(Γ).
3. (Selten, 1975) A perfect equilibrium of Γ is a profile of strategies σ that is the limit
of a sequence of interior strategy profiles {σλ}λ∈N such that for each λ ∈ N and each
i ∈ N , σλi places probability greater than 1/λ on an a given action only if it is a best
response to σλ−i. We denote this set by T(Γ).
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4. (Myerson, 1978) A proper equilibrium of Γ is a profile of strategies σ that is the
limit of a sequence of interior strategy profiles {σλ}λ∈N such that for each λ ∈ N,
each i ∈ N , and each pair of actions {ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai, if Ui(σ
λ
−i, ai) > Ui(σ
λ
−i, aˆi), then
σλi (aˆi) ≤ (1/λ)σ
λ
i (ai). We denote this set by P(Γ).
We propose an alternative refinement of Nash equilibrium. It is based on the hypothesis
that observed behavior in a game, even though noisy, satisfies the following property. This
hypothesis is testable with finite data sets.
Definition 1. A profile of strategies σ ≡ (σi)i∈N is weakly payoff monotone for Γ if for
each i ∈ N and each pair of actions {ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai such that σi(ai) > σi(aˆi), we have that
Ui(σ−i, ai) > Ui(σ−i, aˆi).
Intuitively, a profile of strategies is weakly payoff monotone for a game if differences in
behavior reveal differences in expected payoffs.
As any theoretical benchmark one should not expect that Nash equilibrium will be
observed in a strict sense in the strategic situations that a game represents. At best, if one
samples data from agents’ behavior, this data will not allow us to reject the hypothesis that
behavior conforms with one of these predictions. If we have available a characterization of
the behavior that is usually observed, it follows that the Nash equilibria that are separated
from observable behavior will always be rejected. Thus, even though we cannot know for
sure whether there will be a Nash equilibrium that will not be rejected, we confidently
know that some of them will. The following definition articulates this idea when observable
behavior is weakly payoff monotone.
8Our definition of perfect equilibrium corresponds to Myerson (1978)’s characterization of Selten (1975)’s
perfect equilibrium.
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Player 2
b1 b2
a1 1, 1 0, 0
Player 1 a2 0, 0 0, 0
(a) Game Γ1
Player 2
b1 b2
a1 2, 2 2, 1
Player 1 a2 2, 3 0, 0
(b) Game Ψ
Table 1: (a) a game in which the set of empirical equilibria is a proper subset of the set of Nash equilibria;
(b) a game in which there are empirical equilibria in which player 1 chooses a weakly dominated strategy
with positive probability.
Definition 2. An empirical equilibrium of Γ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ that is the limit of
a sequence of weakly payoff monotone strategies for Γ. We denote this set by E(Γ).
The following property of a strategy profile, which implies weak payoff monotonicity,
will allow us to provide an alternative characterization of empirical equilibrium.
Definition 3. A profile of strategies σ ≡ (σi)i∈N is payoff monotone for Γ if for each i ∈ N
and each pair of actions {ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai, σi(ai) ≥ σi(aˆi) if and only if Ui(σ−i, ai) ≥ Ui(σ−i, aˆi).
4 Examples
It is well known that perfect equilibria and proper equilibria are Nash equilibria. One can
easily see that proper equilibria are empirical equilibria. Since for each finite game this
equilibrium refinement is non-empty (Myerson, 1978), we conclude that empirical equilibria
exist.
Lemma 1. For each Γ, E(Γ) 6= ∅.
The following examples illustrate the differences of empirical equilibria with undomi-
nated equilibria, trembling hand perfect equilibria, and proper equilibria. Our first exam-
ple allows us to easily see that empirical equilibrium may be a proper refinement of Nash
equilibrium.
Example 1. Consider game Γ1 in Table 1 (a). This game was proposed by Myerson (1978)
to illustrate that some Nash equilibria are intuitively implausible. There are two Nash
equilibria in Γ1, (a1, b1) and (a2, b2). Only (a1, b1) is an empirical equilibrium in this game.
Indeed, for each distribution of actions of player 2, player 1’s utility from playing a1 is
greater than or equal to the utility from playing a2; thus, in a profile of weakly payoff
monotone distributions of play, agent 1 will always play a1 with probability at least 1/2
(Fig. 1 (a)); thus, (a2, b2) cannot be approximated by weakly payoff monotone behavior.
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σ2(b1)
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(a) Γ1
σ1(a1)
σ2(b1)
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0.5
1
1
(b) Ψ
Figure 1: (a) Weakly payoff monotone distributions (shaded area) and Nash equilibria of Γ1; σ1(a1) is
the probability with which agent 1 plays a1. Equilibrium (a1, b1) can be approximated by weakly payoff
monotone behavior. Thus, it is an empirical equilibrium of Γ1. Equilibrium (a2, b2) cannot be approximated
by weakly payoff monotone behavior. Thus, it is not an empirical equilibrium of Γ1. (b) Weakly payoff
monotone distributions and Nash equilibria of Ψ; each Nash equilibrium in which agent 1 plays a1 with
probability at least 1/2 is an empirical equilibrium.
If this game is played and agents behavior is weakly payoff monotone and approximates a
Nash equilibrium, it is necessarily (a1, b1).
Each refinement that rules out weakly dominated behavior coincides with empirical
equilibrium in game Γ1. Undominated equilibria and empirical equilibria are independent,
however.
Example 2. Consider game Ψ in Table 1 (b). Player 2 has a strictly dominant strategy
in this game. Thus, in each Nash equilibrium σ of Ψ, σ2(b1) = 1. Agent 1 is indifferent
between both actions if agent 2 plays b1. Thus, the set of Nash equilibria of this game is
the distributions in which agent 1 randomizes between both actions and agent 2 plays b1.
Now, let σ be a weakly payoff monotone distribution for Ψ. Since b1 strictly dominates
b2, σ2(b1) ≥ σ2(b2). If σ2(b2) > 0, U1(σ2, a1) > U1(σ2, a2). Thus, it must be the case that
σ1(a1) ≥ σ1(a2). If σ2(b2) = 0, U1(σ2, a1) = U1(σ2, a1). Thus, σ1(a1) = σ1(a2). Thus, the
set of weakly payoff distributions for Ψ are those at which σ1(a1) ≥ 1/2 and σ2(b1) ≥ 1/2,
except those at which σ2(b1) = 1 and σ1(a1) < 1/2 (Fig. 1 (b)). The set of empirical
equilibria of Ψ are the Nash equilibria in which agent 1 plays a1 with probability at least
1/2. Since a2 is weakly dominated by a1 for player 1, almost all of these empirical equilibria
involve one player playing a weakly dominated action with positive probability.
Empirical equilibrium does a subtle selection from the Nash equilibrium set. It deter-
mines the plausibility of a strategy based on its relative merits with respect to the alternative
actions that the agent may choose. The following example drives this point home. It illus-
trates it for a parametric family of games. This family is a generalization of a game proposed
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Player 2
b1 b2 b3
a1 1, 1 0, 0 −7− c1,−7− c2
Player 1 a2 0, 0 0, 0 −7,−7
a3 −7− c1,−7− c2 −7,−7 −7,−7
Table 2: Game Γc2 where c ≡ (c1, c2), c1 > 0, and c2 > 0.
by Myerson (1978) to show that it is possible to introduce weakly dominated actions in Γ1,
and considerably change its set of trembling hand perfect equilibria.
Example 3. Consider game Γc2 for some c ≡ (c1, c2), c1 > 0, and c2 > 0 (Table 2). Standard
arguments show that for each c > 0,
N(Γc2) = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), (a3, b3)},
T(Γc2) = U(Γ
c
2) = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)},
P(Γc2) = {(a1, b1)}.
In contrast to these refinements, the empirical equilibrium set of Γc2 depends on c. First,
note that for no c > 0, (a3, b3) is an empirical equilibrium of Γ
c
2. This is so because a2
weakly dominates a3 for player 1. Thus, in any weakly payoff monotone distribution for Γ
c
2,
player 1 plays a2 with a probability that is at least the probability with which she plays
action a3. Thus, no sequence of weakly payoff monotone distributions for Γ
c
2 converges to
(a3, b3). On the other hand for each c > 0, (a1, b1) ∈ P(Γ
c
2) ⊆ E(Γ
c
2).
Let us now examine the plausibility of (a2, b2) in Γ
c
2. Think of the payoffs in the game
as dollar amounts. Consider first a small c, say c1 ≈ c2 ≈ 0.01. Let σ be an empirical
distribution of play that approximates (a2, b2). In such a situation, U1(σ2, a1) ≈ 0 >
U1(σ2, a3) ≈ −7 and U2(σ2, b1) ≈ 0 > U2(σ2, b3) ≈ −7. Thus, if expected utility guides
the choices of the players, one can expect that player 1 will play a1 at least as often as a3,
and player 2 will play b1 at least as often as b3. If this is so, action a1 will have a greater
utility than action a2 for player 1, and action b1 will have a greater utility than action b2
for player 2. Thus, if expected utility guides the choices of the agents, σ will not be close
to (a2, b2). Thus, a plausible empirical distribution, i.e., one that is informed by expected
utility for this game, will never be close to (a2, b2).
Now, consider a large c, say c1 ≈ c2 ≈ 100,000. Again, if σ is an empirical distribution
of play that approximates (a2, b2) and is guided by expected utility, player 1 will be playing
a1 at least as often as a3, and player 2 will be playing b1 at least as often as b3. In contrast
with our previous case, it does not follow that necessarily action a1 will have a greater
utility than action a2 for player 1, and action b1 will have a greater utility than action b2
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for player 2. This will only happen if player 1 is playing a1 at least one hundred thousand
times as often as a3, and player 2 is playing b1 at least one hundred thousand times as
often as b3. Thus, it is possible that σ is informed by expected utility, i.e., σ1(a1) > σ1(a3)
and σ2(b1) > σ2(b3), and at the same time U1(σ2, a2) > U1(σ2, a1), U2(σ1, b2) > U2(σ1, b1),
σ1(a2) ≈ 1, and σ2(b2) ≈ 1. Essentially, since the possible loss for player 1 from playing a1
is about 100,000.00, player 1 can be scared away from playing a1 if player 2 is playing b3
more than once each 100,000 times she plays b1. This is still compatible with b3 being the
worst alternative given what the other agent is doing.
These arguments can be easily formalized to show that
E(Γc) =
{
{(a1, b1)} if min{c1, c2} ≤ 1,
{(a1, b1), (a2, b2)} Otherwise.
One cannot expect that if one brings these games to a laboratory setting or has the oppor-
tunity to collect field data on them, the threshold min{c1, c2} = 1 will be a good predictor
of a structural change in the behavior of the agents. However, it is reasonable that behavior
in this game will depend on the size of c, as empirical equilibrium predicts, i.e., equilibrium
(a2, b2) will be relevant only for high values of c. Undominated equilibria, perfect equilibria,
and proper equilibria all miss this point. Undominated equilibrium and perfect equilibrium
miss that when c is too low, actions a2 and b2 are de facto “weakly dominated” when they
are played with almost certainty. That is, if they were going to be played with probability
close to one, actions a1 and b1, would be preferred for the respective players. Thus, we can
rule this equilibrium out by means of the following observation. It is not reasonable that we
will observe a distribution of play in which an agent is not playing her unique maximizer of
utility with high probability, say more than random play.
Finally, proper equilibrium dismisses (a2, b2) independently of c. Think of our exam-
ple with high c. For (a2, b2) to be a proper equilibrium of Γ
c
2, for large λ there must be
a distribution of play σλ satisfying two conditions: (i) σλ is close to (a2, b2), and thus
U1(σ
λ
2 , a1) ≈ 0 > U1(σ
λ
2 , a3) ≈ −7 and U2(σ
λ
2 , b1) ≈ 0 > U2(σ
λ
2 , b3) ≈ −7; and (ii)
σλ1 (a1) > λσ
λ
1 (a3) and σ
λ
2 (b1) > λσ
λ
2 (b3). For distributions where λ ≥ 100,000, a2 and
b2 are not maximizing choices for players 1 and 2, respectively, meaning (a2, b2) cannot be
a proper equilibrium. Thus, the reason why proper equilibrium dismisses (a2, b2) for high c
is that it uses the same parameter for proximity to (a2, b2) and for the agents’ reactivity to
differences in expected utility. This allows us to draw a stark difference of this refinement
and empirical equilibrium. Proper equilibrium is a decision-theoretical, thought experiment
in which a utility maximizing agent considers the possibility that another utility maximiz-
ing agent makes a mistake. Confronted with this thought, a utility maximizing agent will
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determine a Nash equilibrium as implausible because it is impossible that agents who are
infinitely reactive to expected utility make self-sustaining mistakes arbitrarily close to the
equilibrium. By contrast, empirical equilibrium is an exercise performed by an observer
based on weak payoff monotonicity, a testable property of behavior. The observer knows
that if this property is satisfied by empirical frequencies, only empirical equilibria can be
approximated by data.
5 Behavioral foundations of empirical equilibrium
5.1 Payoff monotonicity
We start with a useful alternative characterization of empirical equilibria that simplifies the
computation of this set in applications and is essential for the subsequent analysis: The set
of empirical equilibria of a game can be equivalently defined by proximity of interior payoff
monotone behavior.
Theorem 1. σ ∈ E(Γ) if and only if σ ∈ N(Γ) and there is a convergent sequence of interior
payoff monotone distributions for Γ, {σλ}λ∈N, whose limit is σ.
The characterization of the set of empirical equilibria by means of approximation of
interior payoff monotone distributions simplifies its computation in a given game. Interior
payoff monotone distributions are a strict subset of the weakly payoff monotone distribu-
tions. Their analysis is usually simpler because they do not include corner cases that can
be involved and time consuming. In sufficiently general games the gain may be significant
(e.g. Velez and Brown, 2019a).
Theorem 1 indicates a form of stability of empirical equilibria. Think for instance of
an equilibrium in a game that is itself a non-interior weakly payoff monotone distribution,
e.g., a Nash equilibrium in which each agent plays her unique best response.9 One will
always conclude that the equilibrium is an empirical equilibrium by taking the respective
constant sequence. Theorem 1 implies that this is not the only sequence that will sustain
the argument. One will always be able to find a sequence of interior payoff monotone
distribution that converges to the equilibrium.
5.2 Regular QRE
Agents’ behavior in economic experiments often deviates from Nash equilibrium. Behavior
in these experiments is not random, however. A popular model for the empirical analysis of
9These equilibria are usually referred to as strict (c.f., Harsanyi, 1973).
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data from experiments is the regular Quantal Response Equilibrium model (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1996; Goeree et al., 2005). This model replaces the assumption that agents best
respond to the actions of the other players, with a reduced-form noisy best response that
satisfies some plausibility axioms but is otherwise unrestricted. There is extensive empirical
evidence suggesting that regular QREs fit agents’ behavior in experimental games (Goeree
et al., 2018).10
A quantal response function (QRF) for agent i in game Γ is a function pi : R
Ai → ∆(Ai).
For each ai ∈ Ai and each x ∈ R
Ai , piai(x) denotes the value assigned to ai by pi(x). A
QRF pi is regular if it satisfies the following four properties (Goeree et al., 2005):
- Interiority : pi > 0.
- Continuity : pi is a continuous function.
- Responsiveness: for x ∈ RAi , η > 0, and ai ∈ Ai, piai(x+ η1ai) > piai(x).
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- Monotonicity : for x ∈ RAi and {ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai such that xai > xaˆi , piai(x) > piaˆi(x).
A quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of Γ with respect to a profile of QRFs, p ≡
(pi)i∈N , is a fixed point of the composition of p and the expected payoff operator in Γ
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), i.e., a profile of distributions σ ≡ (σi)i∈N such that for each
i ∈ N , σi = pi(Ui(σ−i, ai)ai∈Ai). We refer to a QRE for a profile of regular QRFs, p, as a
regular QRE of Γ with respect to p.
Because regular QRFs are interior, monotone, and continuous, each regular QRE is an
interior payoff monotone distribution for Γ. The converse also holds. That is, the regular
QRE model can be seen as a basis for interior payoff monotone behavior.
Lemma 2. Let σ be an interior payoff monotone distribution for Γ. Then there is a regular
QRF, p, for which σ is a QRE for Γ with respect to p.
Even though QRFs are not observable, they allow us to articulate the idea of agents’
sophistication. If agents behavior is close to a Nash equilibrium we can only say that these
agents’ choices are close to best responses, not that these agents are almost best responders.
Thus, it is interesting to identify the conditions under which we can also say that a sequence
of behavior that converges to a Nash equilibrium can be associated with agents who in the
limit are utility maximizers.
Definition 4. A sequence of regular QRFs for a game Γ, {pλ}λ∈N is utility maximizing in
the limit if for each convergent sequence of QREs of Γ with respect to the corresponding
QRFs, its limit is a Nash equilibrium of Γ.
10It may be necessary to allow for heterogeneity in quantal response functions across agents and for
deviations from the common prior information structures (see Goeree et al., 2018, for a survey).
111ai denotes the vector in R
Ai that has 1 in component ai and 0 otherwise.
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We are ready to define a refinement of Nash equilibrium in the same spirit as empirical
equilibrium, but taking as basis for plausibility of behavior regular QRE for increasingly
sophisticated regular QRFs.
Definition 5. σ ∈ ∆ is approachable by regular QRE that are utility maximizing in the limit
if there is a sequence of regular QRF profiles for Γ, {pλ}λ∈N, which is utility maximizing
in the limit, and a convergent sequence of QREs for Γ with respect to the corresponding
QRFs, {σλ}λ∈N, whose limit is σ. We denote this set by R(Γ).
Clearly, for each Γ, R(Γ) ⊆ N(Γ). The interpretation of this refinement is similar to that
of empirical equilibrium. That is, if one expects a regular QRE model will satisfactorily
fit data, allowing for all its parametric incarnations, then the only Nash equilibria that are
plausible are those approachable by regular QRE that are utility maximizing in the limit.
The regular QRE model is an attractive basis for plausibility of equilibria in normal
form games. However, if we insist on basing our refinement solely on properties falsifiable
with finite data, QRFs and their properties do not pass the bar. These functions are not
observable.
Fortunately, we do not have to choose between these notions of plausibility of behavior
in games.
Theorem 2. For each Γ, E(Γ) = R(Γ).
Theorem 2 allows us to alternatively describe empirical equilibrium in a way that speaks
closely to the practice in experimental economics. If one expects that data will fit a regular
QRE model, the only Nash equilibria that can be approximated by data are the empirical
equilibria.
5.3 Control costs
We learn from Theorem 2 that if behavior is weakly payoff monotone and approaches a Nash
equilibrium, there is a regular QRE model that fits this behavior. The family of regular
QRFs is infinitely dimensional. Thus, this theorem does not point exactly to a parametric
family of models that is well specified for the analysis of experimental data.
A first candidate that comes to mind to solve this issue is the structural form of QRE.
This model starts from an additive perturbation of payoffs satisfying some regularity as-
sumptions that guarantee behavior is uniquely identified and induces a quantal response
function. If one restricts perturbations to be independent, or more generally to satisfy cer-
tain symmetry properties, the induced QRF of a structural QRE model is regular. It turns
out that the structural QRE model is tied to the separability of payoffs and perturbations:
15
For each non-trivial action space in which at least an agent has at least three actions, there
are games in which some weakly monotone behavior that accumulates towards a Nash equi-
librium, cannot be generated by any structural monotone QRE (Velez and Brown, 2019c).
Thus, the structural monotone QRE model, including all its parametric incarnations,
e.g., the logistic form, is not flexible enough to account for some payoff monotone behavior
in finite games. This brings the need to find a parametric incarnation of the regular QRE
model that spans all possible payoff monotonic behavior, and thus is suitable for maximum
likelihood estimation and empirical analysis. In this section we develop such a parametric
model. As a byproduct we provide a constructive proof of our results in Sec. 5.2.
An alternative approach to rationalize deviations from utility maximizing behavior in
normal form games is van Damme (1991)’s control costs model. Here agents are parameter-
ized by a function that determines how difficult for the agent is to make no mistake when
playing a given strategy.
A control cost function for player i is fi : [0, 1]→ R∪{∞} with the following properties.
- fi is strictly decreasing with fi(0) =∞ and fi(1) = 0.
- fi is continuously differentiable on (0, 1].
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- fi is a strictly convex function.
Given a normal form game Γ ≡ (N,A, u) and a profile of control cost functions f ≡
(fi)i∈N the associated game with control costs is that in which players are N , agent i’s action
space is ∆(Ai), and payoff of action profile σ ∈ ∆ is for each i ∈ N , Ui(σ)−
∑
ai∈Ai
fi(σi(ai)).
For each σ−i ∈ ∆−i, there is a unique best response for agent i in each control cost game,
which solely depends on the profile of expected utility of the different actions in Γ (Lemma
4.2.1 van Damme, 1991). Let pfi be this function. One can easily see that this function is
a regular QRF (van Damme, 1991; Goeree et al., 2018).
The control cost model is less general than the regular QRE model to the extent that
control cost functions impose some restrictions of behavior across different extended games,
i.e., if one varies u. We now show that for a fixed u, they are behaviorally equivalent.
Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of the control costs game associated with Γ and f . By
interiority of each pfi and continuous differentiability and strict convexity of each fi, σ can
be characterized by the first order conditions (Lemma 4.2.3 van Damme, 1991): for each
12van Damme (1991) assumes that each fi is twice differentiable. One can easily see that Lemmas 4.2.1-
4.2.5 and Theorem 4.2.6. in van Damme (1991) go through with our weaker assumption. One needs
continuous differentiability in order to apply Lagrange’s theorem in Lemma 4.2.3. All other results follow
from convexity and continuity. The greater generality of our model allows us to easily construct control cost
functions hitting some specific targets of its derivative without matching the second derivative.
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i ∈ N and {al, ak} ⊆ Ai,
Ui(σ−i, al)− Ui(σ−i, ak) = f
′
i(σi(al))− f
′
i(σi(ak)).
Thus, we can span the whole spectrum of interior payoff monotone behavior with a family
of control costs functions whose derivative can be chosen for each i ∈ N at |Ai| − 1 given
points in (0, 1). Indeed, an asymptote at zero stitched to a second order spline is flexible
enough to interpolate any increasing slope and at the same time guarantee strict convexity
and continuous differentiability.
Formally, let σ be interior and payoff monotone for Γ. Suppose for simplicity that
Ai ≡ {a1, ..., aK} and σi(a1) ≤ ... ≤ σi(aK). Let ml+1 < 0 and ml ≡ ml+1−(Ui(σ−i, al+1)−
Ui(σ−i, al)). Since σ is payoff monotone for Γ, ml ≤ ml+1. The following function is strictly
convex, strictly decreasing, and interpolates slopes ml and ml+1 at the respective extremes
of the interval in which it is defined: for each y ∈ [σi(al), σi(al+1)],
f(y) ≡ f(σi(al+1)) +ml+1(y − σi(al+1)) +
ml+1 −ml
2(σi(al+1)− σi(al))
(y − σi(al+1))
2. (1)
Let ε > 0. Define fi on [σi(aK), 1] as y 7→ (ε/[2(1 − σi(aK))])(y − 1)
2.13 Then, stitch the
second degree polynomials on the subsequent intervals [σi(al), σi(al+1)] for l = K − 1,K −
2, ..., 1, i.e., define fi as in (1) in the respective intervals. Finally, stitch a strictly decreasing
and strictly convex asymptote defined on (0, σi(a1)]. With a view towards identifying control
costs functions with further properties, one can add a calibration point y∗i ∈ (0, 1) such that
y∗i 6∈ {σi(a1), ..., σi(aK)} and guarantee that fi(y
∗) < fi(σl(al)) + ε where σi(al) is the
minimum in {σi(a1), ..., σi(aK)} that is greater than y
∗. Let us refer to f ≡ (fi)i∈N so
constructed as a spline calibrated by σ, y∗ ≡ (y∗i ), and ε.
Lemma 3. Let σ be an interior payoff monotone distribution for Γ; y∗ ∈ (0, 1)N such that
for each i ∈ N , y∗i 6∈ σi(Ai); and ε > 0. Then σ is a Nash equilibrium of the control costs
game associated with Γ and each spline calibrated by σ, y∗, and ε.
The control costs model also allows us to identify sequences of regular QRFs that are
utility maximizing in the limit. We say that a sequence of profiles of control costs func-
tions, {fλ}λ∈N, vanishes, if for each i ∈ N and each x ∈ (0, 1], limλ→∞ f
λ
i (x) = 0. It is
well known that the behavior in games with vanishing control costs can converge only to
Nash equilibria of the underlying game (van Damme, 1991, Theorem 4.3.1).14 Thus, for
13This is simply a strictly decreasing, strictly convex, function such that fi(1) = 0, which parameterizes
our construction.
14Technically, Theorem 4.3.1 in van Damme (1991) applies only to vanishing sequences of control cost
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a sequence of vanishing control cost functions its associated sequence of regular QRFs are
utility maximizing in the limit.
Empirical equilibria can be alternatively characterized as the limits of behavior in games
with vanishing control costs.
Theorem 3. Let σ ∈ N(Γ) and {σλ}λ∈N a convergent sequence of interior payoff monotone
distributions for Γ whose limit is σ. Then, there is an increasing κ : N→ N and {yκ(λ)}λ∈N,
where for each λ ∈ N, yκ(λ) ∈ (0, 1)N , such that:
1. As λ→∞ the sequence of splines calibrated by σκ(λ), yκ(λ), and 1/κ(λ) vanishes.
2. For each λ ∈ N, σκ(λ) is a Nash equilibrium of the control costs game associated with
Γ and the spline calibrated by σκ(λ), yκ(λ), and 1/κ(λ).
6 Discussion
6.1 Beyond weak payoff monotonicity
The equivalence of E(Γ) and R(Γ) provides a formal link between our basis to determine
plausibility of behavior in a game and the standard practice in experimental economics.
It is common to find experimental studies in which deviations from Nash behavior are
rationalized by the logistic QRE or other parametric forms of regular QRE (see Goeree
et al., 2002, for a survey). Essentially, experimental economists have found that these
parametric models capture part of the intuition and comparative statics observed in data.
Great emphasis is usually placed on the extent to which the parametric models fit data.
However, there is usually lack of formal statistical test of payoff monotonicity and the other
building blocks of these models, an issue that has been pointed out by Haile et al. (2008).
Thus, even though a superficial reading of experimental literature suggests that the
accumulated experimental evidence supports that payoff monotonicity is a plausible char-
acterizing invariant of empirical distributions in strategic situations, the reality is that one
cannot formally conclude this from the ubiquitous statements of fitness.
Testing for weak payoff monotonicity is data demanding. It is difficult to come across
data sets that are powerful enough to reject this property. Essentially, it is easy to find data
sets in which one can find evidence that the probability with which two actions available
to an agent are played are statistically different. Weak payoff monotonicity requires that
expected utilities should follow the same order. In order to have good estimates of these
functions of the form εf with ε→ 0. One can easily see that his argument extends for a general sequence of
vanishing control cost functions as we define it because our assumption also implies that for each x ∈ (0, 1],
(fλi )
′(x)→ 0. We have included an explicit proof of this result in an online Appendix.
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expected utilities one needs good estimates of the whole distribution of actions. This requires
large data sets for games with realistic action spaces.
Given these data limitations, it is sensible to test for less data demanding implications of
weak payoff monotonicity. For instance, one can verify whether there is a positive correlation
of the probability with which an agent plays an action and an unbiased estimator of its
expected utility. We have done this exercise with experimental data from fair allocation
experiments (Brown and Velez, 2019) and dominant strategy mechanisms (Velez and Brown,
2019b). In both cases there is strong support for the positive association of the probability
with which agents choose their actions and their expected utility.
An alternative window to test for weak payoff monotonicity with limited data is offered
by games in which actions are related by weak dominance. Suppose that in game Γ, al
weakly dominates action ak for agent i. Then, in any weakly payoff monotone distribution
for Γ, agent i should play al with weakly higher probability than ak. Following this lead,
Velez and Brown (2019b) documented violations of weak payoff monotonicity in second-
price auction games (Andreoni et al., 2007) and pivotal mechanism games (Cason et al.,
2006).
One should not be surprised that weak payoff monotonicity can be violated by empirical
distributions in some games. Indeed, this property has the somehow uncomfortable strong
implication that actions with equal expected utility need to be played with equal proba-
bility. Moreover, well-known phenomena as framing effects, rounding, and other regarding
preferences all induce behavior that is less guided by the agents’ search for a higher payoff.
One can reconcile empirical equilibrium analysis with these violations of weak payoff
monotonicity. The value of this analysis is that it is a benchmark that produces policy
relevant comparative statics. Thus, it is enough to make sure that these conclusions do
not depend on the sharp implications of weak payoff monotonicity, and they would be
retained for violations of weak payoff monotonicity that maintain some positive association
of decisions with payoffs, a more robust hypothesis.
Consider the following parametric form of weak payoff monotonicity.
Definition 6. Let m ∈ [0, 1]. A profile of strategies σ ≡ (σi)i∈N is m-weakly pay-
off monotone for Γ if for each i ∈ N and each pair of actions {ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai such that
Ui(σ−i, ai) ≥ Ui(σ−i, aˆi), we have that σi(ai) ≥ mσi(aˆi).
For m = 1 the property exactly corresponds to weak payoff monotonicity. For m > n,
m-weak payoff monotonicity implies n-weak payoff monotonicity. For m = 0 the property
imposes no restrictions in data.
Definition 7. Let m > 0. An m-empirical equilibrium of Γ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ that
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is the limit of a sequence of m-weakly payoff monotone strategies for Γ. We denote this set
by Em(Γ).
This parametric refinement spans the whole range between empirical equilibrium (m =
1) and Nash equilibrium (m = 0). Using this language one can be more precise and state the
specific assumptions on our characterization on behavior that supports a given comparative
static. For instance, in Velez and Brown (2019b) all results hold for any given m > 0. In
Brown and Velez (2019) and Velez and Brown (2019a) the essence of all results is sustained
for any given m > 0. Moreover, in this environment, the characterization of empirical
equilibria changes continuously with m, so the conclusions for m = 1 are not substantially
changed for m ≈ 1.
6.2 Proximity to Nash equilibria
We have defined empirical equilibrium as a refinement of Nash equilibrium. Our construc-
tion can be understood as a reduced form evolutionary process that we leave unmodeled.
That is, if behavior is weakly payoff monotone and approximates mutual best responses
—for reasons that we do not explain, but whose effect we can empirically test— it will be
an empirical equilibrium. We characterize the profiles that can result from such a process.
This does not mean that we assume that in each game a Nash equilibrium will be a good
prediction.
In applications of game theory one usually assumes that a Nash equilibrium will be
realized. It is in this context that our definition has its most relevance. If one is already
assuming that a Nash equilibrium will happen and is using this theory to evaluate policy,
design a mechanism, etc., one should account for the empirical plausibility of equilibria.
Even if one is skeptical about the converge to a Nash equilibrium, there are practical
reasons to advance empirical equilibrium analysis of a game. Even though the proximity to
a Nash equilibrium cannot be expected universally, there is some evidence that it occurs in
some games. For instance, it is common that the parameter of logistic QRE models usually
increases when it is estimated for later periods in experiments (c.f., McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995).15 Weak payoff monotonicity or alternative characterizations are too lax and impose
few restrictions on data themselves. For instance uniformly random play by all agents
is always weakly payoff monotone. Even though it is possible to obtain some comparative
statics and conclusions from the analysis of these limited restrictions (c.f., Goeree and Louis,
2018), it is only when they are paired with self-sustaining behavior that they achieve more
15It is worth noting that the interpretation of structural QRE estimates requires some care, given the po-
tential misspecification of these models (Velez and Brown, 2019c). Non-parametric tests suggest convergence
to a Nash equilibrium in some environments (Brown and Velez, 2019).
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power. Remarkably proximity or evolution towards mutual best responses is also a testable
hypothesis. Thus, empirical equilibrium analysis provides a more powerful benchmark to
evaluate experimental and field data.
6.3 Empirical equilibria and the purification theorem
It is known that each so-called regular equilibrium, say σ ∈ N(Γ), has the following property
(see van Damme, 1991, for a definition). For each sequence of randomly perturbed versions
of Γ, with vanishing perturbations, there is a subsequence of equilibrium behavior in the
perturbed games that converges to σ (Harsanyi, 1973; van Damme, 1991). This means that
each regular equilibrium is an empirical equilibrium. More strikingly, given an action space,
the complement of the set of games for which all Nash equilibria are regular has Lebesgue
measure zero (Harsanyi, 1973). This means that given an action space and any probability
distribution on the set of all games that is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure, the probability that empirical equilibrium produces a strict refinement of the Nash
equilibrium set is zero.
This brings an immediate question. Why should we study, characterize, and have in-
terest on a refinement of Nash equilibrium that determines all Nash equilibria are plausible
for almost all games? There is an important reason to do so. Games of interest are not
randomly chosen. First, an important application of game theory is to analyze strategic
situations that arise when real life institutions are operated. These institutions are the
result of years or centuries of human interaction. There is no reason to think that these in-
stitutions are randomly chosen. Indeed, when games require certain incentives, their payoffs
are non-generic. For instance, game Γ(2,2) (see Table 2) was designed by Myerson (1978) to
illustrate that a pair of weakly dominated strategies in a two-by-two game can end up being
a perfect equilibrium if one enlarges the game with two weakly dominated strategies. The
result is that the flat ranges of utility that this requires leads to a game that is non-generic.
Second, a mechanism designer or a market designer has the privilege to choose the games
to use in order to achieve the objectives he or she pursues. In some cases these objectives
will lead to a single game. This game is not randomly chosen. For instance the well-known
second-price auction, pivotal mechanism, VCG mechanisms, Student Optimal Differed Ac-
ceptance mechanism, Top Trading Cycles mechanism, Uniform Rule, and Median Voting
are all mechanisms that are best or unique in their class (see Velez and Brown, 2019b for
details). Each of these mechanisms induces direct revelation games that are non-generic
and for which empirical equilibrium analysis produces significant insights (Velez and Brown,
2019b). In some other situations the mechanism designer will have a range of mechanisms
that achieve the objectives he or she is looking for. In this case empirical equilibrium anal-
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Top Dog
10 15 20
10 10, 30 15, 25 20, 20
Underdog 15 5, 15 15, 25 20, 20
20 0, 20 0, 20 20, 20
Table 3: Game Φ.
ysis can allow the designer to inform the choice of a mechanism by means of the empirical
plausibility of their equilibria (e.g. Velez and Brown, 2019a).
6.4 The appeal of weakly dominated behavior
Those who view game theory as a normative theory, may not be persuaded by empirical
evidence and consider the analysis of weakly dominated behavior only of the realm of
behavioral economics. If game theory consists of finding the solution of a game, i.e., the
best recommendations for a group of agents who will play it, it is counter intuitive at first
that one can recommend an agent to choose a weakly dominated strategy. Why should an
agent choose an action that is seemingly careless? The answer is that by doing so the agent
may be enforcing an equilibrium outcome that is advantageous to him or her. An example
will drive this point home.
Consider game Φ in Table 3. This game can be thought of as a stylized partnership
dissolution game. Two players, Underdog (U) and Top Dog (T), decide on the division of a
pie of forty units. Each player has three possible actions {10, 15, 20}, that one can think of
as bids. A higher bidder receives the pie, braking ties in favor of T. The agent who receives
the pie transfers her bid to the other agent, but when U receives the pie, it shrinks to a size
of twenty.
In the only undominated Nash equilibrium of Φ, both agents bid 10 with certainty. Game
Φ defies this prediction. Experiments show that players in strategic situations equivalent to
this game persistently exhibit weakly dominated behavior (Brown and Velez, 2016, 2019).
In some experimental sessions (with no repeated game effects) behavior conforms to a Nash
equilibrium in which the agent who plays the role of U in Φ plays the equivalent of 15 with
positive probability, and T plays 15 (Brown and Velez, 2019).
Some introspection reveals that there is a perfectly compelling reason for U to play 15
or even 20 in Φ. If she were to play 10 with certainty, T would play 10 with certainty.
That would give U a payoff of 10. By playing 15 with positive probability, U enforces an
equilibrium that gives her a payoff of 15. Bidding 10 for T is a bad idea when U is bidding
15 with enough probability. Thus, if this is happening, U will end up with a payoff of 5
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after bidding 15 with low probability. In the event that this happens, U fully understands
that she could have done better by playing 10, but she does not regret having played 15
in order to maintain the incentives of T in check. There is hard evidence that this is so.
In the variation of this experiment in which agents are asked sequentially for their actions,
usually referred to as divide-and-choose game, when T moves first, U still replies with high
probability with the equivalent to action 15 when T bids 10 (Brown and Velez, 2016).
Choosing a weakly dominated action for U is essential to this player in order to enforce an
outcome that she finds normatively compelling in this game: That the pie is split 15-25 or
20-20, instead of 10-30.
Thus, one cannot label U’s weakly dominated behavior in this game as irrational or
even boundedly rational. There is no reason to recommend that player U stick to bidding
10 when this, done with certainty, will give her a payoff of 10. Indeed, we find no reason
to recommend an agent to never take a potentially costly action that has the purpose to
maintain in check the excess of others.
There is of course self sustaining weakly dominated behavior that cannot be made sense
of. Game Γ1 in Example 1 probably illustrates this well. Moral values and virtues that
are cultivated by societies, as frugality and non-wastefulness seem expressions of a desire to
prevent this type of behavior.
Empirical equilibrium achieves some balance in discriminating among weakly dominated
behavior. In game Γ1 it rules out all weakly dominated behavior. In game Φ empirical
equilibrium predicts the pie is split 10-30 or 15-25. There is no empirical equilibrium in
which the pie is split 20-20. This is consistent with our intuition in this game and still
acknowledges that bidding 20 for U is perhaps too extreme.
Lemma 4. σ ∈ E(Φ) if and only if either (i) both U and T bid 10 with certainty; or (ii)
T bids 15 with certainty and U mixes between 10 and 15, bidding 15 with a probability in
the range [1/3, 1/2].
7 Concluding remarks
We present a new approach to equilibrium analysis, empirical equilibrium, inspired by the
finding that individual data—while often quite different from Nash behavior—tends to obey
the axiom of weak payoff monotonicity. In the tradition of Harsanyi (1973), we refine Nash
equilibrium by requiring proximity of weakly payoff monotone behavior. We show that
this refinement could be alternatively defined by requiring proximity of regular QRE (The-
orem 2) and, in particular, by equilibria in control cost games (Theorem 3). Given the
popularity of these models for the analysis of data from economics experiments, our results
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provide a connection between the practice in this field and our theory: A researcher who
expects one of these models will fit behavior in an experiment, also needs to expect that
when empirical distributions approach mutual best responses, they will approach an em-
pirical equilibrium. Remarkably, our refinement produces a delicate selection of the Nash
equilibrium set that does not discard all weakly dominated Nash equilibria. Because of
this, the conclusions obtained from it are not easily dismissed based on the abundant data
that shows the persistence of weakly dominated behavior in many environments. Even
though it is a relatively permissive refinement, it produces policy relevant testable compar-
ative statics in applications of game theory. In particular, in mechanism design it allows
one to conclude that typical invariance properties are not necessary for the so-called full
implementation (Velez and Brown, 2019a); in a partnership dissolution problem, it reveals
structural differences among competing mechanisms that are essentially equivalent for the
Nash equilibrium prediction (Brown and Velez, 2019; Velez and Brown, 2019a); in the gen-
eral problem of strategy-proof implementation, it allows one to characterize the mechanisms
whose plausible equilibria are truthful equivalent(Velez and Brown, 2019b).
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Payoff monotone distributions are weakly payoff monotone. Thus we
only need to prove that an empirical equilibrium is always the limit of interior payoff mono-
tone distributions. Let µ be weakly payoff monotone for Γ. Let ε > 0. We prove that there
is an interior γ that is payoff monotone for Γ such that ||µ − γ|| < ε. This implies that
σ ∈ N(Γ) is the limit of a sequence of weakly payoff monotone distributions for Γ if and
only if it is the limit of a sequence of interior payoff monotone distributions for Γ.
For each λ > 0 and each i ∈ N , let xi ∈ R
Ai 7→ lλi (xi) ≡ (l
λ
iai
(xi))ai∈Ai ∈ ∆(Ai) be the
function defined by
lλiai ≡
exp(λxiai)∑
aˆi∈Ai
exp(λxiaˆi)
.
It is well-known that this function is a regular QRF (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). It is
usually referred to as the Logistic QRF. For each i ∈ N , each ζ ∈ (0, 1), and each profile of
distributions β ∈ ∆(A), let
f ζi (β) ≡ (1− ζ)µi + ζl
λ
i ((Ui(β−i, ai))ai∈Ai).
Let γζ be a fixed point of f ζ , that exists because f ζ is continuous. Let {ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai.
24
Suppose first that µi(ai) = µi(aˆi). We know that
lλai((Ui(γ
ζ
−i, bi))bi∈Ai) ≥ l
λ
aˆi
((Ui(γ
ζ
−i, bi))bi∈Ai),
if and only if Ui(γ
ζ
−i, ai) ≥ Ui(γ
ζ
−i, aˆi). Thus, Ui(γ
ζ
−i, ai) ≥ Ui(γ
ζ
−i, aˆi) if and only if γ
ζ(ai) ≥
γζ(aˆi). Suppose then that µi(ai) > µi(aˆi). Since µ is weakly payoff monotone for Γ,
Ui(µ−i, ai) > Ui(µ−i, aˆi). Since as ζ → 0, γ
ζ → µ, there is c > 0 such that for each ζ < c,
γζi (ai) > γ
ζ
i (aˆi) and Ui(γ
ζ
−i, ai) > Ui(γ
ζ
−i, aˆi). Thus, for each pair {ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai, there is
c > 0 such that for each ζ < c, Ui(γ
ζ
−i, ai) ≥ Ui(γ
ζ
−i, aˆi) if and only if γ
ζ(ai) ≥ γ
ζ(aˆi). Since
Γ has finite action spaces, there is c > 0 such that for each ζ < c, each i ∈ N , and each pair
{ai, aˆi} ⊆ Ai, Ui(γ
ζ
−i, ai) ≥ Ui(γ
ζ
−i, aˆi) if and only if γ
ζ(ai) ≥ γ
ζ(aˆi).
Proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2. Since best response operators in games with control
costs are regular QRFs, Lemma 2 is a corollary of Lemma 3. When a sequence of control cost
functions vanishes, the corresponding best response operators are infinitely sophisticated in
the limit (See footnote 14). Thus, Theorem 2 is a corollary of Theorem 3.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let f be a control cost function. Since for each fi(0) = ∞, any equi-
librium of the game associated with Γ and f is interior (van Damme, 1991, Lemma 4.2.1).
Moreover, σ is an equilibrium of the control costs game associated with Γ and f if and only
if for each i ∈ N , and each pair {al, ak} ⊆ Ai, (van Damme, 1991, Theorem 4.2.6.)
Ui(σ−i, al)− Ui(σ−i, ak) = f
′
i(σi(al))− f
′
i(σi(ak)). (2)
Thus, given σ, one can construct f for which σ is an equilibrium of the game associated
with Γ and f if for each i one construct fi for which (2) holds.
Let σ be interior and payoff monotone for Γ. Let i ∈ N . Assume that Ai ≡ {a1, ..., aK}.
For each k = 1, ...,K, let uk ≡ Ui(σ−i, ak). Suppose without loss of generality that u1 ≤
... ≤ uK . Since σ is payoff monotone for Γ, σi is ordinally equivalent to u. In particular,
σi(a1) ≤ ... ≤ σi(aK). Let {y1, ..., yL} ≡ {y ∈ (0, 1) : ∃k ∈ {1, ...,K}, σi(ak) = y} be
the set of values that σi takes. For each l = 1, ..., L, let ul ≡ Ui(σ−i, ak) for ak such that
σi(ak) = yl. Suppose without loss of generality that 0 < y1 < ... < yL < 1. Since σi is
ordinally equivalent to u, u1 < ... < uL. Fix ε > 0 and 0 < y0 < y1 and let yL+1 = 1 (y0
is not necessary for the proof of the lemma; we introduce it in order to use the argument
later in the proof of Theorem 3). Let mL+1 ≡ 0; mL ≡ −ε; for each l = 1, ..., L − 1, let
ml ≡ ml+1 − (ul+1 − ul); and m0 = m1 − ε.
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Consider fi that assigns to each y ∈ (0, 1] the value
fi(y) ≡


mL+1(y − yL+1) +
mL+1−mL
2(yL+1−yL)
(y − yL+1)
2 if y ∈ [yL, yL+1].
fi(yl+1) +ml+1(y − yl+1) +
ml+1−ml
2(yl+1−yl)
(y − yl+1)
2 if y ∈ [yl, yl+1), l = 0, ..., L − 1.
fi(y0)−m0y
2
0
1
y
if y ∈ (0, y0)
The function fi is a second order spline stiched to a hyperbole in the interval (0, y0). It
is continuous and has continuous derivative on (0, 1]. Indeed, it coincides with infinitely
differentiable functions in (0, 1] with the exception of y0, ..., yL. In these points, the deriva-
tive from the left and from the right match, so its derivative on (0, 1] is well defined and
continuous. The function is strictly decreasing, for its derivative is always negative on (0, 1).
It satisfies limy→0 fi(y) = ∞. The second derivative of fi is well defined and positice on
(0, 1] \ {y0, ..., yL}. Thus, the function is strictly convex.
Finally, let {as, ak} ⊆ Ai. Let l and t be such that σi(al) = yl and σi(ak) = yt. Suppose
without loss of generality that l < t. Then,
f ′i(σi(as))− f
′
i(σi(ak)) = ml −mr
(ml −ml+1) + (ml+1 −ml+2) + ...+ (mr−1 −mr)
= (ul − ul+1) + (ul+1 − ul+2) + ...+ (ur−1 − ur)
= ul − ur
= Ui(σ−i, as)− Ui(σ−i, ak).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let σ ∈ E(Γ) and {σλ}λ∈N a sequence of interior payoff monotone
distributions converging to σ. Let i ∈ N , Ai ≡ {a1, ..., aK}. By passing to a subsequence
if necessary we can suppose without loss of generality that for each λ ∈ N, σλi (a1) ≤ ... ≤
σλi (aK). By convergence of {σ
λ}λ∈N we have that σi(a1) ≤ ... ≤ σi(aK). Let k be the lowest
index for which Ui(σ−i, ak) = Ui(σ−i, aK). Then, there is η > 0 such that for each l < k,
Ui(σ−i, ak)− Ui(σ−i, al) > η.
Let {fλ} be a sequence of control cost functions constructed as in the proof of Lemma 3
for parameters ε < 1/λ and y0 < 1/λ. Let {ar, as} ⊆ {ak, ..., aK}. Suppose that σi(ak) = 0.
By passing to a subsequence if necessary we can assume that for each λ ∈ N, σλi (ak) < 1/λ
and fλi (σ
λ
i (ak)) < 2/λ (this subsequence is constructed by first selecting a distribution for
which the utility among the best responses of agent i to σ−i have utility differences at most
1/λ and the probabilities are in the required ranges; then for that distribution construct
the function fλi with ε < 1/λ and y0 < 1/λ). Since limλ→∞ σ
λ
i (ak) = 0, for each y ∈ (0, 1],
limλ→∞ f
λ
i (y) = 0. Repeating the argument for each agent we construct a subsequence
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{fλ} that vanishes.
Suppose that σi(ak) > 0 and k > 1. By passing to a subsequence if necessary we
can assume that for each λ ∈ N, σλi (ak−1) < 1/λ, (f
λ
i )
′(σλi (ak−1)) = (f
λ
i )
′(σλi (ak)) +
Ui(σ
λ
−i, ak−1)−Ui(σ
λ
−i, ak−1) < 4/λ, (f
λ
i )
′(σλi (ak)) = 1/λ+Ui(σ
λ
−i, ak)−Ui(σ
λ
−i, aK) < 2/λ.
Then for each λ we can construct a control cost function gλ for which σλ is an equilibrium
of the game associated with Γ and gλ, as in the proof of Lemma 3 for parameters ε < 1/λ
and y0 < 1/λ, and including a calibration point y = 1/λ strictly which is strictly in between
σλi (ak−1) and σ
λ
i (ak) and for which we can set a slope of g
λ
i equal to 3λ. Then, the sequence
of control cost functions {gλ}λ∈N is such that for each y ∈ (0, 1], limλ→∞ g
λ
i (y) = 0. The
result concludes as in the previous case.
Finally, suppose that Suppose that σi(ak) > 0 and k = 1. Note that the slope of each f
λ
i
in the set [yλ0 , 1] is bounded above by 2ε + Ui(σ
λ
−i, a1)− Ui(σ
λ
−i, aK). Since limλ→∞ y
λ
0 = 0
and limλ→∞ Ui(σ
λ
−i, a1)−Ui(σ
λ
−i, aK) = 0, then for each y ∈ (0, 1], limλ→∞ f
λ
i (y) = 0. The
result concludes as in the previous case.
Proof of Lemma 4. Each of the distributions described in the statement of the lemma are
weakly payoff monotone themselves. Thus, by definition they are empirical equilibria of
Φ sustained by the respective constant sequences. Suppose that σ ∈ E(Φ). Let {σλ}λ∈N
be a sequence of interior and payoff monotone distributions for Φ that converges to σ
(this sequence exists by Theorem 1). Let λ ∈ N. Then, UU (σ
λ
T , 10) > UU (σ
λ
T , 15) >
UU (σ
λ
T , 20). Thus, σ
λ
U (10) > σ
λ
U (15) > σ
λ
U (20). Thus, σ
λ
U (20) < 1/3. If limλ→∞ σ
λ =
σ, then σU (20) ≤ 1/3. Thus, UT (σ
λ
U , 15) > UT (σ
λ
U , 20) and consequently σT (20) = 0.
Thus, UU (σ
λ
T , 10) > UU (σ
λ
T , 20). Thus, σU (20) = 0. Thus, σT (20) = 0. Since for each λ,
UU (σ
λ
T , 10) > UU (σ
λ
T , 15), we have that σU (10) ≥ σU (15). Thus, σU (15) ≤ 1/2. Suppose
that σT (15) > 0. Then, σU (15) ≥ 1/3, for otherwise UT (σU , 15) < UT (σU , 10). If σT (10) >
0, then UU (σT , 10) > UU (σT , 15) > UU (σT , 20) and σU (15) = σU (20) = 0. Thus, σT (10) =
1.
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Appendix not for publication
Lemma 5 (van Damme, 1991). Let {fλ}λ∈N be a sequence of control costs functions
that vanishes and {σλ}λ∈N a corresponding convergent sequence of the control cost game
associated with Γ and fλ. Then, {σλ}λ∈N converges to a Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let {σλ}λ∈N be a convergent sequence such that for each λ ∈ N, σ
λ is
an equilibrium of the control cost game associated with Γ and fλ. Let σ ≡ limλ→∞ σ
λ.
Let i ∈ N and ai ∈ Ai be a best response to σ−i for agent i in Γ. Suppose that ak ∈ Ai
is not a best response to σ−i for agent i. We prove that σi(ak) = 0. Since as λ → ∞,
σλ → σ, we also have that σλi (ai)→ σi(ai), σ
λ
i (ak)→ σi(ak), Ui(σ
λ
−i, ai)→ Ui(σ−i, ai), and
Ui(σ
λ
−i, ak)→ Ui(σ−i, ak). Thus, there is Λ ∈ N such that for each λ ≥ Λ, σ
λ
i (ak) ≤ σ
λ
i (ai).
Suppose first that σi(ai) = 0. Since σ
λ
i (ai)→ 0, σ
λ
i (ak)→ 0. Suppose then that σi(ai) > 0.
By (van Damme, 1991, Theorem 4.2.6), for each λ ∈ N,
Ui(σ
λ
−i, al)− Ui(σ
λ
−i, ak) = (f
λ)′i(σ
λ
i (al))− (f
λ)′i(σ
λ
i (ak)).
The left side of the expression above converges to a positive number. Since σλi (al) →
σi(al) > 0 and {f
λ}λ∈N vanishes, (f
λ)′i(σ
λ
i (al)) → 0. Thus, σ
λ
i (ak)) → 0, for otherwise
there is a subsequence of {σλi (ak))}λ∈N that converges in the interior of (0, 1]. If this is so
the right side of the equation above converges to zero. This is a contradiction.
The following proposition formally states our claims in Example 3
Proposition 1. Consider the game Γc in Table 2. Then, for each c > 0,
N(Γc) = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), (a3, b3)},
T(Γc) = U(Γc) = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)},
P(Γc) = {(a1, b1)}.
Moreover,
E(Γc) =
{
{(a1, b1)} if min{c1, c2} ≤ 1,
{(a1, b1), (a2, b2)} Otherwise.
Proof. We first prove that
N(Γc) = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), (a3, b3)}. Let c ≡ (c1, c2) such that c1 > 0 and c2 > 0. One
can easily see that the action profiles (a1, b1), (a2, b2), and (a3, b3) are the only pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria of Γc. Now, let σ ∈ N(Γc). If σ1(a2) > 0, then σ2(b3) = 0. Then,
σ1(a3) = 0. It follows that either σ is equal to (a1, b1) or (a2, b2). Symmetry implies the
same is true when σ2(b2) > 0. Thus, suppose that σ1 is not a pure strategy. Suppose that
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σ1(a1) > 0, σ1(a2) = 0, and σ2(b2) = 0. Then σ2(b3) = 0. Thus, σ = (a1, b1). A symmetric
argument shows that if σ2(b1) > 0, σ1(a2) = 0, and σ2(b2) = 0, then σ = (a1, b1).
It is well known that at each perfect equilibrium no agent plays a weakly dominated
strategy. Clearly, a3 and b3 are weakly dominated for players 1 and 2, respectively. Thus,
T(Γc) ⊆ {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)}. Now, let t ≡ min{c1, c2}, ε ≡ min{t, t/(3c1), t/(3c2), 1/3}, and
for each λ ∈ N, σλ be the strategy profile for which σλ1 (a1) ≡ εc2/(2λt) and σ
λ
1 (a3) ≡ ε/(λt);
and σλ2 (b1) ≡ εc1/(2λt) and σ
λ
2 (b3) ≡ ε/(λt). Then,
U1(σ
λ
2 , a1) = εc1/(2λt)− (7 + c1)ε/(λt) = −7ε/(λc1)− εc1/(2λt),
U1(σ
λ
2 , a2) = −7ε/(λc1),
U1(σ
λ
2 , a2) = −(7 + c1)ε/(2λ) − 7(1 − ε/λ− ε/(λc1))− 7ε/(λc1).
Thus, a2 is the unique best response to σ
λ
2 for agent 1. Symmetry implies that b2 is the
unique best response to σλ1 for agent 2. Since σ
λ
1 places probability at most 1/λ in both a1
and a3; σ
λ
2 places probability at most 1/λ in both b1 and b3; and as λ→∞, σ
λ → (a2, b2),
we have that (a2, b2) ∈ T(Γc).
Let Λ > 2 be such that for each λ ≥ Λ, 1−1/(2λ)−1/(3λ2) > max{c1/(3λ2), c2/(3λ2), 1/λ}.
Let λ ≥ Λ and σλ be the symmetric profile of strategies such that σλ1 (a2) ≡ 1/(2λ) and
σλ1 (a3) ≡ 1/(3λ
2). Thus, U1(σ
λ
2 , a1) − U1(σ
λ
2 , a2) = 1 − 1/(2λ) − 1/(3λ
2) − c1/(3λ
2) > 0.
Clearly, U1(σ
λ
2 , a2) > U1(σ
λ
2 , a3). Similarly, U2(σ
λ
1 , b1) − U2(σ
λ
1 , b2) > 0 and U2(σ
λ
1 , b2) >
U2(σ
λ
1 , b3). Since σ
λ
1 (a1) > σ
λ
1 (a2)/λ, σ
λ
1 (a2) > σ
λ
1 (a3)/λ, σ
λ
2 (b1) > σ
λ
2 (b2)/λ, and σ
λ
2 (b2) >
σλ2 (b3)/λ; and as λ→∞, σ
λ → (a1, b1), we have that (a1, b1) ∈ P(Γc) ⊆ T(Γc).
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